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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Worldwide, the way stocks were traded was previously relatively straight forward, investors 
would convey their intentions to a broker, who then routed these instructions to an exchange 
where the trade was executed with a matching order1 which was part of the consolidated order 
book.2  This way all players in the market had access to the same trading information pertaining 
to a given stock.3  In the last decade however, there has been an increase in the available trading 
avenues to participants in the stock market worldwide, causing a considerable volume of stock 
trading to shift from the centralised market place to an environment of multiple trading 
avenues.45  As a result, the same stocks are traded on the exchanges and on off-exchange private 
trading avenues.  These developments left regulators perpetually behind the needs and 
operation of the market making it necessary to enact rules and legislation to govern and regulate 
these alternative avenues.6   
The intention behind this paper is to examine off-exchange trading and the policy concerns 
behind it that could call for its regulation.  The laws in other jurisdictions specifically the United 
States and the United Kingdom will be examined to understand how these concerns are 
addressed.  Finally, the South African regulation of off-exchange trading avenues under the 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 20126 will be analysed to come to an understanding in comparison 
to other jurisdictions whether there are other platforms on which to trade listed shares other 
than on the exchange on which they are listed and if so, whether these off-exchange trades are 
regulated adequately (in line with the previously raised policy concerns). In the concluding 
chapter, recommendations are made as to the way forward for South Africa.   
While there could be off-exchange trading of different securities, the focus in this instance is 
equity securities only.  Off-exchange trading was previously referred to as ‘upstairs trading, 
                                                 
1 PWC An Objective Look at High Frequency Trading and Dark Pools (2015) .  
2 An order book is an electronic list of buy and sell orders for a specific security organized by price level.  The 
consolidated order book lists the number of shares being offered at each price point. It is an aggregation of orders. 
Degryse H, De Jong F and Kervel Vv 'The impact of dark trading and visible fragmentation on market quality' 
(2014) 19 Review of Finance   
3 Bierdermann Z 'Off-exchange Trading, Dark Pools and their Regulatory Dilemmas' (2015) 60 Public Finance 
Quaterly 78.  
4 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016  
5 0:42 UTC  
6 ORGANISATION JCSAIIR Dark Pools, Dark Orders and Other Developments in Market Structure in Canada  
CANADA, http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities -Category2/csa_20091002_23-
404_consultationpaper.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 11:24 UTC 6 Financial Markets Act of 2012.  
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this took place in an ‘upstairs market’ which can be in the broker dealer firm and not through 
an exchange which would be a regulated market.7  With time, this form of trading has evolved 
to employ the use of technology to facilitate trading from a distance, entities also have 
formalities and structures in place to facilitate the trading of these securities.8  One of such 
methods are through dark pools.   
Although, this paper’s emphasis is not largely on the intricacies of the way in which ‘dark 
pools’ function, breaking down the concept is necessary to illustrate how aspects of their 
operation becomes a legal issue and how trading in them differs from on an exchange.   Dark 
pools in this instance have been selected for consideration to understand the regulation of 
private trading avenues and off-exchange trading of listed equity securities.  Worth noting is 
the fact that a unique and homogenous definition to these private trading avenues is still yet to 
be found as they differ in types and design and in turn induce different definitions.9   
With reference to the work of various authors, I intend to show that the policy concerns behind 
need for the regulation of formalised dark pools are substantially the same as those behind the 
need to regulate off-exchange trading of listed securities.10  Several authors hold the view that 
when alternate trading systems function effectively, they can be a productive component of the 
market if they protect the investors property rights in information, solve the conflict of interest 
problems that arise when individual firms function both as dealers and brokers as well as 
innovate towards reducing the costs of transacting.11 These policy issues both positive and 
negative will be examined in the context of the regulations enacted in other jurisdictions.  
In the European Union, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 12 came into 
operation in November 2007.  It provides a unified framework for securities which 
encompasses investment firms, Multilateral Trading Facilities, 13  regulated markets and 
                                                 
7 Gordon J and Davies P Principles of Financial Regulation Oxford University Press   2016) 150  
8 Garvey R, Huang T and Wu F Why Do Traders Choose Dark Markets?  (2014)   
9 Gabriel J 'Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new regulations' ^Fifty Shades of lights in Dark  Pools new 
regulations 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC, available at http://uplaw.ch/fifty-shades-lights-dark-pools-new-regulations/, 
accessed on 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC  
10 Gabriel J 'Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new regulations' ^Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new 
regulations 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC, available at http://uplaw.ch/fifty-shades-lights-dark-pools-new-regulations/, 
accessed on 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC  
11 Macey JR and O'Hara M 'Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics  
Perspective.' (1999) 28 The Journal of Legal Studies 17  
12 Markets in Financial instuments Directive European Union  2004/39/EC   
13 A multilateral trading facility or ‘MTF’ is a multilateral system operated by an investment firm or market  
operator which brings together multiple third party buying and selling interests in financial instruments in 
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financial instruments.14 It sought to capture the execution of trading of securities irrespective 
of the trading methods used to conclude these transactions. This directive removed the 
concentration rule which allowed orders to be routed to platforms other than the regulated 
market allowing these orders to be executed on other newly recognised platforms. 15   This 
resulted in the legal recognition of Multilateral Trading Facilities and systematic internalizers 16 
allowing them to legally function side by side with the existing regulated markets.17  
In the United States of America, the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000 moved to 
recognise and regulate the different forms of off-exchange trading that were arising. This was 
done through Regulation ATS,18 they took further steps in 2005 through Regulation NMS.19  
The regulation on alternative trading systems allowed these entities to choose whether to 
register as national securities exchanges under the Exchanges Act19 or as broker dealers and 
comply with additional requirements dependent on nature of activities and trading volume with 
the aim being to integrate them into the national market system.20  
In South Africa, the Financial Markets Act22 defines an exchange as a person who constitutes, 
maintains and provides an infrastructure for bringing together buyers and sellers of securities, 
matching bids and offers for securities of multiple buyers and sellers and whereby a matched 
bid and offer for securities constitutes a transaction.21  The Act makes it an offence to operate 
an exchange without being licensed to do so22 and prohibits any person from acting as an 
authorised user unless authorised by a licensed exchange. 23   (Where an authorised user is 
                                                 
accordance with non-discretionary rules. From: Article 4.15 Markets in Financial instuments Directive European 
Union  2004/39/EC   
14 Article 1 Markets in Financial instuments Directive European Union  2004/39/EC   
15 MiFID removed the concentration rule allowing listed securities to be traded on alternate avenues. Under this 
rule, orders could only be routed to regulated exchanges however with the operation of MiFID, parties are now 
free to choose the platform they want to route the orders to. From: Gentile M and Fioravanti SF 'The Impact of 
Market Fragmentation on European Stock Exchanges' (2011) 69 CONSOB Working Paper   
16 Systematic internalizers are also included in the definition of investment firms as they are an  organised, frequent 
and systematic basis to deal on own account by the execution of client orders outside a regulated market or 
Multilateral Trading Facility.  From:  Gkantinis S 'Regualtion and Innovation: Comparing the U.S. and European  
Stock Trading Markets' (2006) 13 Harvard Law School Student Scholarship Series 35  
17 Annex 1 Markets in Financial instuments Directive European Union  2004/39/EC    
18 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-40760 17 CFR 19 
Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-76474 17 CFR.  
19 United States of America Securities and Exchanges Act of 1934  
20 Securities and Exchange Commission 17 CFR Parts 201 Release No. 34-39884; File No s7-12-98 
22 Act 19 of 2012  
21 s1 Financial Markets Act of 2012  
22 s109(c) Financial Markets Act of 2012  
23 s4 Financial Markets Act of 2012  
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essentially a stock broker).  Furthermore, a person may only carry out the business of buying 
or selling listed securities if that person;   
(i) is an authorised user and complies with the relevant exchange rules,   
(ii) effects such buying and selling through an authorised user in compliance with the 
relevant exchange rules,   
(iii) is not an authorised user but a financial institution transacting as a principal or,   
(iv) is a person subject to prescribed conditions if giving effect to a corporate finance 
transaction.24   
If the activities of an entity fall within the above definition of an ‘exchange’, then it must be 
licenced as an exchange.  If the activities do not fall within these criteria, then the entity need 
not register.  I submit that this leaves a limited scope for carrying out off-exchange trades.   
The above definition is the only one in South African law that would allow a party to legally 
constitute and maintain an infrastructure to bring together buyers and sellers of securities.  
Internalisation is the practice of order matching by investment firms which may also be referred  
to as in-house matching.  When firms internalise, they execute client orders for their own 
account as well as agency crosses where client orders are matched against each other.25  The 
Act26 has no provisions that contemplate internalisation of trades which is one of the common 
forms of off-exchange trading and neither do the Equity rules of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange which state that all trades by members need to be matched by the trading system.  
They do however contemplate certain forms of book trades which could facilitate the matching 
of client orders.27  The Act limits any possible scope for firms to internalise to the extent that 
the conduct contravenes Section 4 of the Act of the licensing provisions but does not limit the 
scope of permitted off-exchange trades that an exchange can permit its brokers to conduct.    
Trading shares listed on a licensed exchange is subject to the provisions of the Act28 and other 
relevant subordinate legislation including the rules of the exchange those shares are listed on 
however, in recent years, the regulator has focused on companies which maintained an 
infrastructure facilitating the trade of their own securities that were however not licensed as 
                                                 
24 s24(a)-(d) Financial Markets Act of 2012  
25 Ferrarini G and Recine F 'The MiFID and internalisation' (2006)   
26 Financial Markets Act of 2012  
27 Rule 6.10.01 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules    
28 Financial Markets Act of 2012  
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exchanges. These companies will now be required to register as exchanges or change their 
manner of operation to not fall within the definition of an exchange and therefore be required 
to register.29    
The position of the Financial Services Board is that any off-exchange platform falling within 
the definition of an exchange based on its activities and not licensed as such is operating 
illegally.30  On the basis of existing legislation and regulations I intend to examine the legal 
standing of off-exchange trading of listed equity securities in South Africa and whether there 
are off-market equity security trades that fall through the gaps in regulation by the Act or the 
exchange rules.   
     
                                                 
29 s25 Financial Markets Act of 2012  
30 s109(c) Financial Markets Act of 2012  
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CHAPTER 2: OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING  
(a) WHAT IS OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING?  
The concept of off-exchange trading of listed equity securities is not a novel one.  Previous ly, 
it was referred to as upstairs trading where traders made the deals in their offices before making 
the announcement as to the effect of the trade.31   Upstairs trading would take place in an  
‘upstairs market’ which can be in the broker – dealer firm and not through the trading floor of 
a stock exchange.32  This way, brokers would work privately to find counter parties for the 
orders and to negotiate terms for transactions.33  When this form of trading is done within the 
brokerage firm, the broker-dealer could act as an agent for both parties.34  The trading of listed 
securities would then occur off the floor of the exchange which could essentially resulting in 
an ‘over-the-counter’ transaction. Some exchanges prohibit this manner of trading for securities 
listed on their platform.35  What was previously referred to as upstairs trading has however 
evolved to employ the use of technology to facilitate ‘trading from a distance’ and these entities 
carrying out this form of trading have formalities and structures in place to facilitate the trading 
of these securities.  These structures extend from the way orders are matched and routed to the 
way they are priced.  It is therefore common worldwide for an individual stock to be traded in 
more than one market; this could occur if the same stock is traded in ‘upstairs’ and ‘downstairs’ 
markets. Downstairs markets being the trading floor or the network infrastructure provided by 
an exchange. 36  Orders on such a market would be visible to all market participants while in 
the former they would not be visible.   
The focus in this paper on the trade of listed securities on platforms or through other 
mechanisms other than those provided by the exchange on which they are listed.   
There are several avenues through which investors can conduct these off-exchange trades as a 
growing number of alternative trading systems have been introduced. These offer lower cost, 
off-exchange execution and in some cases, enable institutions to trade directly with one 
                                                 
31 Arin R and Easthope D 'Dark Pools: In the Eye of the Storm' ^Dark Pools: In the Eye of the Storm available at 
http://celent.com/reports/dark-pools-eye-storm, accessed on 03-05-2-16  
32 Gordon J and Davies P Principles of Financial Regulation Oxford University Press   2016) 150  
33 Garvey R, Huang T and Wu F Why Do Traders Choose Dark Mark ets? (2014)   
34 From:http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/upstairs+market   
35 Foley S and Putnins JT Regulatory Efforts to reduce dark reading in Canada and Australia: How have they 
worked? (2014) CFA institute, https://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/Documents/Trade-at%20Rule%20Report.pdf 
accessed on 12-11-2016 15:38 UTC  
36 Booth G, Lin J, T. M and Tse Y 'Trading and Pricing in Upstairs and Downstairs Stock Marke ts' (2002) 14 
Review of Financial Studies   
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another.37  One of these alternative trading systems that match sellers and buyers of securities 
away from the central exchanges are ‘dark pools’.  The other systems that can also be used to 
effect these trades are electronic communications networks, over-the-counter (OTC) 
transactions38 and MTFs (Multilateral Trading Facilities).41  
Off-exchange trading as a form of private trading venue grew in popularity however, still 
maintained an aura of mystery around it.  Jaccard is of the view that, it is nothing but a recent  
and natural evolution of the market as it grew decentralised and over regulated as participants 
needed to fix the market inefficiencies when concluding a block trade.39  While several other 
authors further the view that the initial reasoning behind these platforms was to protect an 
institutional trader from the adverse effect that would arise on an open market when his goal to 
either buy or sell large blocks of stock is revealed.  This large volume on an open exchange 
will affect the price ahead of an intended trade which affects the strategy and overall intended 
position in the market. Hence, they lower the possible impact on the market and prevent the 
likelihood of parties trading ahead of the institutional trader’s order and impacting the market.40    
There are several factors that contributed to the growth of off-exchange platforms for stock 
trading, some of these are:  
Shorter and Miller submit that when the markets are volatile, investors prefer to trade through 
an exchange. This is due to the certainty provided by the exchanges because they have 
displayed price discovery and are to a greater extent transparent.  As the markets grew and got 
more stable, the demand for off-exchange platforms increased as there was barely any 
difference between trading on the exchanges and on the other platforms.41   
They are also of the view that investors moved to off-exchange platforms to avoid the toxic 
liquidity that is provided by High Frequency Traders that had increased in the more developed 
                                                 
37 Clemons E and Weber B Demand for off-exchange trading systems: Trading Preferences of Investors on the  
London Stock Exchange. 15-05-1992 ed (1992)   
38 Darragh CK Are you afraid of the Dark? High Frequency trading and the duties of dark pool operators   41 A 
multilateral trading facility or MTF is a multilateral system operated by an investment firm or market operator 
which brings together multiple third party buying and selling interests in financial instrument s in accordance with  
non-discretionary rules. Article 4(15) Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC.  
39 Gabriel J 'Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new regulations' ^Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new 
regulations 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC, available at http://uplaw.ch/fifty-shades-lights-dark-pools-new-regulations/, 
accessed on  11-10-2016 15:13 UTC  
40 Meher J, Sagar J, Owyeung C and Patro V Equity Trading in Dark Pools (Babson College, 2013)   
41 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
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world markets.  A market exposed to high frequency traders runs a higher risk of a 
technological mishap therefore parties moved to platforms where they are protected from high 
frequency traders. The investors on these platforms have the autonomy to choose who to trade 
with. This is a choice they cannot make on an exchange due to the anonymity and open market 
nature under which exchanges function.42  Furthermore, off-exchange platforms tend to charge 
lower fees than the exchanges.  On these platforms, it is also possible to divide larger orders 
into smaller bits and therefore achieve faster execution while incurring lower fees per share 
traded.  On an exchange comparatively, it would be costlier to conclude the trade in several 
small orders. 43   
(b) DARK POOLS AS A FORM OF OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING.  
This paper’s emphasis is not largely on the intricacies of the way in which dark pools function 
however breaking down the concept is necessary to illustrate how aspects of their operation 
becomes a legal issue.  Dark pools were initially designed as a network to facilitate institutiona l 
block trades but have developed to include different order types that allow traders to remain 
anonymous during the trading process. 44   Although exchanges are also anonymous, the 
distinction appears that orders in these platforms are invisible to the people trading on the 
exchange and not these platforms.  In this instance, they have been selected to illustrate the 
current regulation of private trading avenues and off-exchange trading of listed securities.  This 
paper intends to show that the policy reasons behind the need for the regulation of formalised 
dark pools are largely the same as those behind the need to regulate off-exchange trading of 
listed equity securities.   
Dark pools are an alternative trading system.  This is an avenue for matching sellers and buyers 
of securities that is however not traditionally regulated as an exchange.45  For purposes of this 
paper, a dark pool is a venue or mechanism containing non-displayed trading liquidity that is 
                                                 
42 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
43 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
44 Meher J, Sagar J, Owyeung C and Patro V Equity Trading in Dark Pools (Babson College, 2013)  
45 Darragh CK Are you afraid of the Dark? High Frequency trading and the duties of dark pool operators   
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available for execution.46   I submit the view that an institution's in-house pairing of a buyer 
and seller which occurs outside a public exchange is similar to how a dark pool operates.   
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)47 defines dark pools as systems that allow 
participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell securities.48  These orders are crossed 
(matched) at a specific time at a price derived from another market.  A dark pool can also be 
described as an exchange that allows investors to purchase and sell securities without revealing 
their identities or displaying transactions to the public prior to the transaction49 therefore, it 
does not provide quotes into the quote stream available to the public pre-trade50.  This can be 
juxtaposed against conventional trading platforms which could be viewed as ‘lit’ due to the 
availability of consolidated stock price information that is publicly displayed on the 
consolidated tape.51  Therefore, in broad terms, they are characterised by limited or no trade 
transparency, anonymity and derivative pricing (in most instances mid-quote pricing on quotes 
from a central exchange).52    
Non-displayed liquidity is however not new to stock trading but the way it occurs has evolved 
rapidly with technology.  Looking at the New York Stock Exchange for instance, the brokers 
had reserve orders sitting on their trading desks. Today with technology it is faster and easier 
to search for liquidity.53     
In practice the term dark pool has been used to refer to a wide variety of either trading centres 
or services offered by alternative trading systems that do not publicly display quotes, electronic 
communications networks which allow for some or all of the quantity of an order to not be 
publicly displayed and broker dealers in the practice of systematic internalizing.54  Therefore, 
                                                 
46 Banks E Dark Pools; The Structure and Future of Off-Exchange Trading and Liquidity Palgrave Macmillan   
2010) 8  
47 The United States Security and Exchange Commission   
48 Klock M 'The SEC's New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation ahead of Economic  
Theory and Evidence' (1999) 753 Florida Law Review   
49 Darragh CK Are you afraid of the Dark? High Frequency trading and the duties of dark pool operators     
50 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
51 Consolidated tape is a high speed electronic system that reports the latest price and volume data on sales of 
exchange listed stocks. Hazen TL 'Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the Effects of Options, 
Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market' (1987) 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.   
52 Buti S, Rindi B and Werner IM 'Diving into dark pools' (2011)   
53  Sachs G Market Structure Overview (2009) http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/mktstructure.pdf accessed on 19-12-2016 01:53 UTC  
54  Sachs G Market Structure Overview (2009) http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/archive/mktstructure.pdf accessed on 19-12-2016 01:53 UTC  
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it can be held that the term encompasses all off-exchange platforms with emphasis on not 
publicly displaying the quotes.    
When an investor places an order to buy or sell on an exchange typically, this quote is availab le 
to the public, in a dark pool however, an investor is only aware of potential counter parties only 
after the submission of the order.  The trader may also opt to inform a limited number of other 
traders who are also clients of the dark pool of the availability of this order.55  Under dark pool 
trading, the bid/ask quote is only made public to the consolidated tape after the completion of 
the transaction with the dark pool indicating that the trade was done but not revealing their 
identity.56  In South Africa, this subsequent non-disclosure of the identity of investors would 
be subject to notification obligations in s56 and s122 of the Companies Act. 57 The consolidated 
tape is a high speed electronic system that reports the latest price and volume data on sales of 
exchange-listed stocks. The data reflected on the consolidated tape is generated by various 
market centres.58   The information pertaining to the specific trade in a dark pool is undisclosed 
before and during trading but published to the consolidated tape which shows the last sale and 
trade data for the traded securities.59  Exchanges on the other hand are both pre-trade and post 
trade transparent as they publicly disseminate market and trade information in real time.60  
The distinction between upstairs trading and what would in effect be dark pool is that with a 
dark pool there are formalised structures in place to effect the trading of securities.  These 
structures could facilitate the way orders are matched, routed and priced.  In the jurisdiction of 
the Unites States, these structures have been recognised and regulated since 1998,64 the United 
Kingdom on the other hand, until recently did not recognise these platforms under the 
regulatory structure61    
                                                 
55 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
56 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016 
17:13 UTC  
57 Companies Act 71 of 2008  
58 https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersconsolthtm.html  
59  Kerkhoff M 'Dipping our Toes into Dark Pools' ^Dipping our Toes into Dark Pools available at 
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/matthew-kerkhoff/dipping-our-toes-into-dark-pools, accessed on 
05-01-2016 14:53 UTC  
60 Dark pools, Internalization and Equity Market Quality. CFA Institute October 2012 Page 10 From:  
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2012.n5.1 accessed on 20-04-2016 11:11 UTC 64 
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-40760 17 CFR.  
61 Markets in Financial instuments Directive European Union  2004/39/EC   
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According to Shorter and Miller, generally, these platforms operate similarly to conventiona l 
exchanges regarding pricing and prioritization62 of trades but do not disclose the market depth.  
The market depth would show the available (pending) unfilled orders for traded securities thus, 
a trader only becomes aware of the availability or lack thereof of potential counterparties after 
the submission of an order.63  This non-disclosure goes towards the founding intention of this 
form of trading which was to conceal the execution of large traders with the aim of avoiding 
any price distorting effect.  Although there is no pre-trade transparency in respect of trades in 
a dark pool, they are subject to post trade disclosure obligations.  This makes it a requirement 
to make public (to the consolidated tape or national market system) the time, price and volume 
of each trade after it has been executed.64  Bierdermann explains that this ‘exemption’ from 
pre-trade transparency limits the likelihood of information leakage, making them a preferred 
avenue for block traders.65  
To a certain extent, due to their opaque nature they can be said to inhibit the free trade that open 
and transparent auction markets depend on to work, but are considered by institutional investors 
as a safer place to trade than the open regulated market.66  With the growth of this trading 
avenue, traders began to use it not only for block trades but also for any other transactions in 
order to avoid the pre-trade transparency requirements which cannot be avoided on the open 
market.67  Shorter and Miller explain that the functioning of dark pools has no direct impact on 
prices on the exchange as long as the trades are executed with a matching order; however, it 
may have  an indirect effect.68  On this note, the argument can be made that although dark pool 
trades will not affect price because they are invisible until disclosed, they remove the impact 
an open bid would have had on the market and therefore avoid the price movement that an open 
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bid would have caused.  Participants may also be able to alter the value of a large trade in a 
dark pool by placing large buy or sell orders on the exchange whether they intend to execute 
these trades or not and affect the prices of the securities.69   
The rise of high frequency trading motivated the rise of alternative trading avenues.70 High 
frequency traders or HFTs can detect the availability of large orders due to the speed at which 
they transact. This puts investors transacting in large blocks of stock at a disadvantage because 
the HFTs can detect their orders, and transact against them resulting in the price paid or 
received for stocks being affected negatively.  Dark pools reduce the likelihood of this 
happening because of the order book is not transparent.   Although an advantage for institutiona l 
traders, it has to be weighed against the potential that it harms the price discovery process. This 
is more likely when a significant portion of that security’s trade volume is dark pools. The lack 
of transparency could also erode the public investors’ confidence in the public quote system. 71    
(c) ORDER MATCHING AND PRICE DETERMINATION ON OFF-EXCHANGE 
PLATFORMS.   
Matching of orders is done when there are two equal but opposite orders to buy and sell a 
security.72  On the traditional exchange, this would occur on the trading floor or with advances 
in technology, by computer algorithm.  Off-exchange avenues like dark pools may however 
match orders on a continuous basis which would allow traders to trade at any time that the 
market is open.  Comparatively, call markets only have trading open for a specified session. 
The traders all need to execute their trades within the session when the market is open.73   
The orders may be matched in one of several ways depending on the way the chosen avenue 
operates. They may match orders on a continuous basis, during a call auction or notify 
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participants about potential matches 74 . When orders are matched continuously, they are 
executed as they are received and there is an available matching order during the trading day. 
Most stock exchanges match their orders on a continuous basis at any time that the market is 
open.75 This gives traders and investors flexibility in choosing when to transact.  With a call 
auction, the orders are collected and a predetermined time and venue is set for the auction to 
determine the price. The entire bid and ask orders are aggregated and transacted all at once. 
This leads to the determination of a single trading price based on the bid and ask orders that 
had been submitted and the trading volume is maximised.76   
Primarily, these avenues arrive at stock prices in three ways; this could be done automatica lly 
by matching the midpoint between the best bid and offer price quoted on the exchange.77  The 
best bid price is the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for stock and the best offer is the 
lowest price that a seller is willing to sell the stock.  Matching in this manner could result in 
meaningful price improvement for both parties involved in the transaction.78  When prices are 
arrived at in this manner, the transaction does not have much of an adverse effect on price 
discovery because the prices used are derived from the exchange.   
Alternatively, they could use negotiated pricing where the buyer and the seller come to an 
agreement on the price at which to transact.  This method has no market makers83 or order 
pricing as the buyer and the seller actively work towards negotiating a price for the stock.84  
This is likely to have an adverse effect of price discovery because the agreed price is not a 
result of the market actors of demand and supply on the conventional stock market.   
They may also use derived pricing where the price of the stock in question is determined based 
on the price movement of another stock. This is like the pricing of stock options.79     
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(d) CATEGORIES OF OFF-EXCHANGE PLATFORMS.   
Off-exchange trading platforms can be placed into three broad categories with the distinct ion 
being drawn depending on the entity sponsoring it.  This however is not a closed list.   
Exchange-owned or agency broker: acting more like agents than principals, these operate with 
prices delivered from central exchanges80  resulting in them lacking any element of price 
discovery.81  Examples are: Liquidnet, Instinet and exchange owned (including those offered 
by BATS and the New York Stock Exchange).82  The broker dealer founded Liquidnet intends 
to start operating on the South African capital markets at the time of this research.  In 2010, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange took steps to allow for hidden order functionality and formed 
the dark pool ‘Block X’.  This functionality has however been scrapped and the JSE now aims 
to integrate opaque orders to be part of the central order book.83  This is however only limited 
to volumes which would qualify a transaction as a block trade.  These hidden orders can interact 
with all the liquidity available on the central exchange and the advantages that could come with 
it.  They also heavily interact with the ‘lit’ market so as not to fragment liquidity.  Therefore, 
having a minimal, if any, effect on market quality.84    
Electronic Market Makers: These are provided by independent operators who act as principals 
for their own accounts. Unlike exchange owned or agency broker dark pools, these do not 
calculate prices from the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO)91 hence there is an element of 
price discovery.   
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Broker dealer owned: These are established by large brokers and dealers for clients and at times 
their own proprietary traders. With prices derived from order flow, these have an element of 
price discovery.  Examples are: Morgan Stanley’s MS Pool, Goldman Sachs’ Sigma X, Credit 
Suisse’s Crossfinder, and Citi’s Citi Match.85  Broker-dealer established dark pools may at 
times transact by use of internalization where the investor’s transaction is executed by filling 
the order from available stock held by the broker as inventory. When the broker trades as 
principal, the stocks would be from inventory.86  
(e) ADVANTAGES PRESENTED BY OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING PLATFORMS.  
There are numerous potential positives that are the reason for the rising popularity of 
offexchange platforms such as dark pools and these are discussed below.   
Their nature allows for the execution of large orders with minimal market impact arguably 
making trading cheaper.87  This benefit extends to lower volume securities as well.88  Notably, 
the crucial benefit sought of avoiding information leakage is not always achieved because there 
is very slight possibility of the buy and sell order sizes being the same size. The information 
leakage occurs when a trader submits a relatively small order and it is fully picked up. This 
indicates the likelihood that there is more of that stock still available to trade.  Furthermore, 
traders could resort to practices like pinging89 to reveal hidden order sizes.  The difference in 
sizes is an avenue for leakage of information.90   
An indication of interest or merely suspicion of interest by an institutional trader would 
adversely affect the market resulting in said trader either receiving less when selling shares or 
paying more when buying them.  Anonymity would reduce the likelihood of price volatility 
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that would occur when there is a transparent central order book at the cost of concealing market 
depth.  A transparent central order book would cause the market to react to the additional supply 
or demand caused by the large order. Some off–exchange platforms allow institutional traders 
to execute trades with minimal market impact.91  The opaque nature of dark pool trading does 
not disclose the trading party or the trade volume until post trade and keeps most of the market 
in the dark until post trade disclosures.  Hoffman P, concludes that this allows the large traders 
to get the prices they would have on an open market. Furthermore, dark orders leave less room 
for high frequency traders with predatory intentions (predatory trading induces and exploits 
other traders’ need to reduce their positions)92 from driving the price of a security either higher 
or lower depending on the information received and the rest of the market from acting against 
the interests of the block trader presenting a possible advantage for them.93    
The nature of equity pricing in dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms could allow their 
investors to get a better price on listed securities.94 I submit that this advantage pertains to both 
parties when they are trading large blocks of stock.  In the trading of large stock orders, a dark 
pool may execute orders matching the mid-way point between the best bid and ask price which 
could result in a better price for both the buyer and seller.  The best bid and offer prices will be 
derived from the market activity on a central exchange.  Hence the institutional trader or dark 
pool participant benefits from a price created by the open market without exposure to the risk 
that the open market would present. On an open market, the order would be exposed to High 
Frequency Traders.  As a result, the dark pool is only affecting price discovery to a lesser extent 
and the participants in the dark pool have objective criteria to use in the determination of 
prices.95 Whether this results in a false market price will be addressed in the succeeding chapter.   
Traders incur exchange fees when executing trades through a formal exchange.  To fill a large 
order with minimal market impact, a broker may have to split the order into smaller bits and 
route through different exchanges or alternatively execute several smaller trades on the same 
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exchange.  The execution of several small trades will result in higher transaction costs. 
Comparatively, investors on off-exchange platforms like dark pools participants do not incur 
the same fees as those on exchanges, therefore even when an order is broken into several bits 
to increase the likelihood of execution there are no added transaction costs incurred. 
Furthermore, the routing to other brokers or splitting for the same exchange presents the risk 
of information leakage that could adversely affect price before all the orders are filled 96 
Internalisation97 is also likely in dark pools preventing the need for the order to be routed to 
another platform.   
Unlike exchanges, dark pools give investors more control as to who they want to trade with. 
This gives traders more autonomy when choosing buyers or sellers.98  Although dark pool 
trading is anonymous, when making a choice on which dark pool to trade in, investors cannot 
know who they are trading with but may ask to be made aware of whom the other participants 
in the pool are.  This becomes necessary when disposing off large blocks of stock as it reduces 
the fear of the likelihood of a hostile takeover.  It also keeps investors safe from predatory 
traders who would adversely affect price by limiting the parties with access to the stock.   On 
a traditional exchange, any party would be able to purchase any stock available and the party 
selling would have no control over the identity of the party.  The regulated market set up which 
gives access to all participants therefore makes it riskier to make strategic business decisions 
in the context of a listed company.    
These off-exchange platforms present both possible advantages and disadvantages to the 
operation of the stock market. The disadvantages are addressed as policy concerns that make a 
case for their regulation.   
With the increased use of alternative trading systems, there has been a need to bring their 
functioning up to date with the existing regulatory measures. The policy issues that arise and 
need to be considered mainly revolve around; price formation, market abuse and equal access 
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to the liquidity held in dark pools and other off-exchange platforms. The concerns surrounding 
market abuse and equal access (fairness) give rise to the legal issues.  
The speed of invention in trading of securities means in several cases the impact of these 
platforms can only be understood in retrospect by examining their effect on stock trading and 
the stock markets.  Bierdermann writes that this has left regulators perpetually behind the needs 
of the market and called for a necessity to make changes to the existing regulations to protect 
investors and allow effective operation of the markets.99 In the European, American, Canadian 
and Australian markets the regulators have taken steps and are still taking steps to align the 
regulations to the changing requirements of the market.  In Europe, this was attempted through 
the review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFiD). In the USA, the SEC in 
2010 reviewed the equity market structure.  These changes to the regulat ion and the motivat ion 
behind them will be analysed in a later chapter of this paper.   
This chapter lays the foundation and highlights the trading platforms that this paper focuses on.  
The next chapter will examine the policy concerns that arise with these off-exchange platforms.   
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CHAPTER 3: POLICY REASONS FOR THE REGULATION OF OFF-EXCHANGE 
TRADING.   
The preceding chapter introduced the concept of off-exchange trading of equity securities using 
dark pools as a consideration and looking at  possible advantages that led to their use and 
growth.  This chapter lays out the policy concerns behind the need for regulating the trade of 
securities and more specifically why, to the extent permitted, the trade of listed equity securities 
off-exchange should be regulated similar to exchange trades.   
Securities regulation comprises the regulation of public issuers of securities, secondary markets 
and market intermediaries. The purpose of regulation is to address the gaps in information 
between the various market participants; issuers and investors, clients and intermediaries and 
between counterparties to transactions.100  With the aim being to ensure smooth functioning of 
the markets to prevent any likely disruptions and foster public and investor confidence.108   
The Financial Markets Act South Africa, requires exchanges to implement rules and adequate 
measures to ensure investor protection.  An exchange is a self-regulating organisation and must 
enact and enforce its rules.101  When entities participate in off-exchange trading they do not 
have the protection of the rules of an exchange unless the rules of said exchange extend to the 
regulation of off-market trades.  An exception to this is when the off-exchange trading is 
facilitated by the central exchange as is the case with off-book trades as the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.  In certain jurisdictions like the United States of America, Exchanges are classified 
as self-regulatory organizations111 and entities that register as such have duties incurred above 
their primary functions.  They also provide a wide range of services to the issuers and investors 
including regulatory oversight, internal rules of corporate governance, clearing and provision 
of liquidity.102  Comparatively, entities functioning as alternative trading systems do not have 
the same duties and their short term private interests like lower transaction costs and better 
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prices for their clients are in competition with the overall markets’ long term interests which 
call for efficient price discovery, investor confidence and protection.103   
The markets have grown and evolved with other entities providing competition to the 
exchanges. Over-the-counter markets, alternative trading systems and even broker-dealer firms 
are able to fill customer orders completely in-house and provide the liquidity that exchanges 
used to have the monopoly of providing.104  In the proceedings against Barclays Capital, it was 
held that off-exchange trading of listed stocks has increased significantly in recent years, and 
although it could provide many benefits to market participants it also highlights the necessity 
of transparency and a flow of information between the entities that operate these platforms and 
their clients.105   
Alternative trading systems provide services like those of registered exchanges but are in most 
cases regulated as broker dealers.  This creates disparities that could affect investors and the 
market at large.  Furthermore, the activities carried out on these systems may not be adequately 
monitored under the regulatory regime making them prone to market manipulation and fraud.106 
Macey and O’Hara submit the view that when they function efficiently, they are a productive 
component of the market if they;   
• protect their investors property rights in information,   
• solve the conflict of interest problems that could arise when individual firms function 
both as dealers and brokers and,   
• innovate towards reducing transaction costs.107    
These possible benefits could be utilised if these platforms are regulated and monitored 
adequately.   
                                                 
103 Bierdermann Z 'Off-exchange Trading, Dark Pools and their Regulatory Dilemmas' (2015) 60 Public Finance 
Quaterly 78.  
104 Macey JR and O'Hara M 'Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics 
Perspective.' (1999) 28 The Journal of Legal Studies 17.  
105 Barclays Capital Inc Order Instituting Administrative Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A 
of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act. 2016 1 (Securities and 
Exchange Commission)  
106 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf Accessed on 28-10-2016 
10:39 UTC.  
107 Macey JR and O'Hara M 'Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics 
Perspective.' (1999) 28 The Journal of Legal Studies 17  
22  
  
In its concept release on equity market structure, the SEC articulates that, for financial markets 
to work optimally, investors need to be fully informed which requires a flow and access to 
information and the markets need to be free of fraud and manipulation. 108   Fraud and 
manipulation discourage investors and in turn impacts negatively on the public confidence in 
the markets.  One of the factors that allowed the markets to grow to the extent they have is the 
widely-acknowledged benefit that they are normally free from fraud and manipulation.119   
(a) REGULATORY CONCERNS.   
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is the association of 
organisations that regulate the world’s securities and futures markets.109  According to IOSCO, 
there are three (3) main objectives for securities regulation, these are; protecting investor s, 
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent and reducing systemic risk.110  It is 
along these three broad principles that regulators in the different jurisdictions have set up the 
relevant legal framework.  The technical committee of the IOSCO identified several issues 
surrounding the use of off-market platforms especially those with dark orders trading in the 
same securities as transparent markets.111 These issues surround:  
1. The impact on price discovery that dark orders could have on the quality of the market 
when there is a substantial amount of dark orders submitted to off-exchange platforms 
and these may or may not be published.   
2. The impact of market fragmentation on information availability and liquidity on the 
markets.   
3. The impact on the integrity of the markets due to possible differences in access to 
markets and information.112   
It further outlines that the purpose of the regulation with regard to off-exchange platforms 
should be; to minimise the adverse impact of the increased use of off-exchange platforms like 
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dark pools in transparent markets on price discovery process, to mitigate the effect of any 
potential fragmentation of information and liquidity, to ensure that regulators have enough 
information to monitor the use and running of these platforms and dark trade orders, to ensure 
investors have adequate information to enable them to understand the manner in which their 
orders are handled and executed and finally, to increase the monitoring of dark orders and dark 
pools to facilitate an appropriate response.113   
This should all be aimed at the provision of mechanisms that reduce the risk of financial market 
failure, reduction of systemic risk, investor protection, ensuring that the markets are fair, 
efficient and transparent.  Furthermore, securities market regulation should have mechanisms 
that reduce the risk of systemic failure.  The regulations in place should be able to isolate the 
failure, if it arises, to the failing institutions and prevent the failure from affecting the system 
at large.114  Inadequate regulation leaves the market prone to the risk of systemic failure if a 
market participant takes a risk that results in harm to the markets and other participants.  
The regulatory debate revolved around issues of fair competition, access, market fragmentation, 
price discovery, investor protection and surveillance of market abuse. The next sections 
elaborate on these issues raised by the IOSCO.   
(i) PRICE DISCOVERY  
Price discovery is the process through which the market price for a security is established.  This 
price is derived from the interaction between the demand and supply for a security which 
indicates participants’ willingness to transact at a given price.115  Although the ability to trade 
without publicly displaying orders is not new to the market, the IOSCO is of the view that 
offexchange platforms with dark orders could inhibit the price discovery process if orders that 
might have otherwise have been displayed become ‘dark’.116   
Off-exchange platforms that are ‘dark’ do not publish pre-trade data and they collective ly 
account for a growing percentage of the daily trade in stocks.  This raises the concern that the 
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stock exchanges may not reflect the actual market price based on the interaction of demand and 
supply and the available information to the public because these platforms impede the process 
of price discovery.117118  Several of these platforms derive their prices from the midpoint of the 
national best bid and offer prices as quoted on the exchange. Some authors hold the view that 
this is detrimental to the overall quality of the market.119   
Anonymity for block traders enables them to get better value and in turn presents a problem for 
the rest of the market, the prices at which trades are executed may differ from those displayed 
on the public markets for the same security.  This could result in traders who are not participants 
in the dark pool (retail traders) to receive prejudicial prices.120  The loss of price discovery is 
worse when a significant volume of a given security is traded in the dark pools. When the trade 
is eventually reported, it could have an impact on the closing share price that a retail trader may 
not have had an opportunity to participate in making.121 This could lead to the conclusion that 
this could either justify the prohibition of dark pools or the imposition of price discovery 
requirements on these dark pools.   
 (ii)  MARKET FRAGMENTATION   
The increase in trading avenues results in increased fragmentation of the market with regards 
to information and liquidity.122  When shares are traded on a conventional centralised exchange, 
the liquidity and the available information pertaining to share price and availability is 
centralised.  An investor or broker looking for bid information for a listed stock could look no 
further than the information as presented on the central exchange via the consolidated tape and 
market reports.   
The fragmentation of the market could result in increased costs on market research before a 
party can make an informed decision on whether to transact in each stock.133 After the execution 
                                                 
117 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 19-08-2016  
118 :13 UTC  
119 Hatheway F, Kwan A and Zheng H An Emperical Analysis of Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets  
(2013) SSRN,   
120 Klock M 'The SEC's New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation ahead of Economic 
Theory and Evidence' (1999) 753 Florida Law Review   
121 An  Objective  Look  at  High-Frequency  Trading  and  Dark  Pools.  PWC  (2015)  From:  
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resource-institute/publications/assets/pwc-high-frequency-tradingdark-
pools.pdf   
122  Kara 'Shining a Light on Dark Pools' ^Shining a Light on Dark Pools available at 
http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/shining-light-dark-pools, accessed on 11-10-2016 14:39 UTC 
133Klock M 'The SEC's New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation ahead of Economic 
Theory and Evidence' (1999) 753 Florida Law Review   
25  
  
of a trade, information about that trade is reported on the consolidated tape.  This data is 
available to the public.  For off-exchange platforms such as dark pools, less information is 
conveyed.  They merely indicate that the trade was executed off-exchange and not identify the 
specific platform on which the trade was executed furthermore, they do not disclose the bids 
that were made and not accepted.  This hinders the public’s ability to assess the various sources 
of liquidity in stock trading activity. 123   In general, unless a trader can send and receive 
indicators of interest, the only way they could know whether a dark platform has liquidity is to 
route an order to it. This could potentially lead to higher costs involved in finding liquidity and 
impact on market integrity with participants having to ping several platforms to assess 
liquidity.124   
 (iii)  FAIR COMPETITION AND ACCESS.  
One of the objectives of securities regulation as outlined by the IOSCO is to ensure that markets 
are fair, efficient and transparent.  It is in this regard that it made the following statements;  
• ‘The fairness of the markets is closely linked to investor protection and, in particula r, 
to the prevention of improper trading practices.  Market structures should not unduly 
favour some market participants over others.   
• Regulation should aim to ensure that investors are given fair access to market facilit ie s 
and market or price information. It should also promote market practices that ensure 
fair treatment of orders and a price formation process that is reliable; and  
• In an efficient market, the dissemination of relevant information is timely and 
widespread and is reflected in the price formation process.’125   
Fair access is unlikely to be met if equal competitors are treated differently.  Hence the aim of 
regulation should be to level the playing field between different market participants.  This can 
be done by allowing the market forces to fairly influence the viability of Alternative Trading 
Systems.126  Stock exchanges provide equal access to all market participants in a transparent 
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manner, the same cannot be said for certain off-exchange platforms like dark pools especially 
those that are broker dealer sponsored.  The issue of fair access could be partially solved if all 
investors had the same access to all platforms.  Because although an exchange would still 
require full bid disclosure and a dark pool wouldn’t, accessing the dark pool would not reveal 
market depth but allow investors who want to interact with the liquidity in the dark. Some 
platforms limit their accessibility to certain investors (in some cases only institutiona l 
investors) and this prevents other market participants from accessing liquidity that is only in 
the dark127 and hindering them from accessing what could likely be a more profitable avenue 
to transact.139 I submit that this only partially solves the problem because although brokers and 
asset managers can justify the costs of accessing a variety of platforms, it is unlike ly that a 
small investor may be able to incur the costs involved.   The existing market structures should 
not unduly favour some participants over others hence the regulation should ensure fair access 
by all investors to market facilities and information pertaining to the pricing of stocks.  Some 
venues provide their clients with sponsored access to certain trading platforms however it is in 
the investor’s best interests to provide them with equal and non-discriminatory access.128  
Macey and O’Hara also believe transparency plays a key role in the fairness and efficiency of 
equity markets, it links dispersed markets reducing fragmentation, improving price discovery 
and competitiveness of the markets.  However, there is difficulty determining what information 
should be transparent.  Without any transparency markets could end up inefficient and unfair, 
on the other hand transparency could reduce the incentives for information gathering and 
penalize traders who are willing to either provide or seek liquidity.129   
Before a trade is executed on a stock exchange, a quotation is publicly displayed for other 
investors and market participants to see.  On off-exchange platforms such as dark pools which 
use indicators of interest, a participant’s indicator is only conveyed to selected market 
participants. 130   The ‘SEC’ is of the view that these indicators contain valuable trading 
information and are deemed actionable when explicitly or implicitly inform the recipient about 
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other available offers.  This conveyance of indicators to only certain participants could create 
a two-tiered market in which the participants that did not get this information are disadvantaged 
and the public does not have fair access to information about the best available prices and sizes 
for stocks that other certain select participants may have access to.131    
Klock, M submits that, the need to make block trades hidden from the public leads to an 
increase in the possibility of the trade not being executed due to the limited liquidity that the 
investor is interacting with.132  As the execution of a trade depends on the matching of orders, 
in an anonymous environment, finding an equilibrium point between demand and supply is 
more complex and therefore the matching of orders as well.  Off-exchange platforms like dark 
pools do not provide a guarantee that the mandate to trade will be implemented,  because for 
an order to be matched there needs to be an order on the opposite side of the market, absent 
which there will be no match and therefore the trade will not be executed.  The limited liquid ity 
that the investor interacts with on these off-exchange platforms increases the likelihood of a 
failure to execute the trade.  This risk is minimised on a public exchange as any one participant 
in the market has access to the order information and therefore acts towards increasing the 
available liquidity. 133   Investor access to the best markets is an objective of the market 
regulators aimed at giving traders the ability to obtain best execution by transacting their order 
at the prevailing price regardless of platform they chose to trade on.134    
 (iv)  INVESTOR PROTECTION.  
Exchanges provide the important function of monitoring and thus protect the investors from 
some aspects of share price manipulation and insider trading.  135  When transacting on an 
exchange, the identity of the counter party is unknown and the parties to the transaction do not 
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have a contractual relationship but rather one with their broker.  In the event of a conflict, the 
exchange can remedy this based on the existing laws and its own rules.136  
Some off-exchange platforms function under limited pre-trade transparency.  This raises 
questions as to whether they could be an avenue for unfair market practices. In the United 
States, the regulators observed that dark pools could be used to facilitate potentially improper 
trades. This could arise as the traders have access to confidential information regarding the 
client’s trades.137    
In 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against an 
operator for falsely advertising that no proprietary trading took place within its pool.  That pool 
gave its proprietary trading desk an unfair informational advantage over other subscribers 
which it used to front run the subscribers’ orders with the full knowledge that this was 
improper.138  Barclays is the operator of an Alternative Trading System registered as Barclays 
LX.  It has been in operation since 1998 pursuant to the adoption of Regulation ATS.  The 
system operates as a ‘dark pool’ that accepts matches and executes orders from clients to buy 
and sell stocks under the National Market System (NMS). As of May 2014, it was the second 
largest Alternative Trading System dealing in stock on the National Market System. 139  
Barclays was found to be in breach of federal securities laws by making materially mislead ing 
statements regarding the way their dark pool was operating.  It was found to have alleged ly 
made misrepresentations to its clients regarding the manner in which its dark pool functioned 
and failed to protect the confidential information of its clients by secretly offering high 
frequency traders access to the client’s order feeds and special order types giving them an 
advantage over subscribers.140  This in some instances allowed the high frequency traders to 
front run the clients offers which was detrimental to the prices received in some cases by the 
clients.  
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The way off-exchange platforms function creates a need for liquidity, this in turn has intensified 
certain conflicts of interest between the operators and the subscribers’ due to their highly-veiled 
nature.141  A broker with an order from an investor could practice front running where they 
trade for themselves ahead of filling the client’s order to benefit from the price quoted by the 
client.142 They may also trade on the opposite side of a strong buy recommendation to their 
clients to benefit from the eventual price movement caused by the increase in demand.  
Proprietary traders could also abuse it by trading against pool clients. This is a risk in broker- 
dealer owned dark pools and electronic market makers who in some cases may act as a princip le 
for the trades they execute.143 The broker operators are able to benefit from information on 
orders flowing into their platforms.144  In instances when the dark pool is run by a brokerdealer, 
during the process of internalization the broker may be able to make a profit on the stock held 
as inventory.145   
When these alternative trading systems act exclusively for their clients, they eliminate the 
conflict of interest problem that arises with the internalization by broker-dealers as they only 
offer a trade execution service.146  The likelihood of a profit motive may affect the ability of 
the broker to fill the order at the best possible price which would be in the best interests of the 
investor.  The broker may then be able to make a secret profit which would be a conflict of 
interest and against the common-law principle of agency.147  Dealers have an incentive to sell 
the weak stock that they have accumulated in inventory as brokers and to purchase the strong 
stocks from their clients.  Regulation attempts to address this conflict by prohibit ing 
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brokerdealers from front-running (trading ahead) a client’s order or maintaining accounts that 
belong to employees of other broker dealers.160   
Financial institutions that make large stock purchases have long been accustomed to breaking 
up their orders to avoid tipping off the market.  However, because buy and sell orders are 
bounced around so widely, algorithms can detect what their intentions are hence they developed 
craftier and high-tech measures to get around this.148  Left unchecked, the orders placed by 
investors in dark pools are vulnerable to predatory trading practices.  Predatory trading 
practices can include slow market arbitrage where high frequency traders seek to profit off the 
minute price differences of stocks on different exchanges.149  High frequency traders may place 
small orders in dark pools to detect any large hidden orders. This practice is known as 
pinging.150  High frequency traders are then able to make an opposite trade by front running 
the available orders and hence making a profit at the expense of the institutional trader in the 
dark pool when the shares are sold back to the investor.151  Since most of these platforms use 
prices displayed on regulated markets as a reference price, it is technically possible to 
manipulate execution prices in dark pools by artificially affecting the prices on the exchanges. 
Furthermore, high frequency traders benefit from the knowledge of price movements on the 
regulated markets before placing their orders in dark pools.152   
As a general principle, participants in a dark pool have no guarantee of getting the best price 
for their securities as there is no guarantee for execution at the best price. Depending on the 
client’s instructions, the broker may have the autonomy to route the order via an exchange (or 
any other avenue) of their choosing, when making this decision the broker may prioritize a 
higher probability of execution over the best price for execution.153  Furthermore, with the 
practice of internalization the interests of the broker may be to transact on the stocks held as 
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inventory which would be advantageous to them but not necessarily always the client and 
unless the regulatory scheme provides for price improvement154 as is the case in the United 
states, it would not be a priority for the broker to execute the trade at the best price for the 
client. 155156    
The different regulation of exchanges and off exchange platforms could provide an opportunity 
for regulatory arbitrage where market participants choose avenues based on which regulations 
in which avenue would provide them with a trading advantage. Uniformity of rules and 
regulations reduces this possibility.157   
The next chapter will examine how these policy concerns have been addressed in the United 
States of America and the European Union.   
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CHAPTER 4: REGULATION OF OFF-EXCHANGE AND DARK POOL TRADING IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.   
The previous chapter to this paper examined the policy concerns that arise with the increased 
use of alternative avenues carrying out off-exchange trading of equity securities.  It is these 
policy concerns that the legislators in the United States of America and the European Union 
aimed to address.  This was done through the Regulation Alternative Trading Systems 
(Regulation ATS) and Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS) in the United  
States and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC in the European Union.   
In November 2007, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC came into force 
in the European Union,158 in the United states the Securities and Exchange Commission had in 
2000 moved to regulate forms of off exchange trading such as dark pools through Regulation  
ATS159 and in 2005 went further with Regulation NMS (NMS for national market system).160  
These were both regulatory changes that were necessary to catch up with the on goings in the 
financial markets after gaps were revealed in the securities regulations and more specific to the 
content of this paper the need to regulate the several other avenues of securities trading whose 
use was on the rise.  Notably, in Europe, dark trading had always been possible but only as 
reserve orders or non-displayed orders offered by broker pools or public trading avenues. 161  
This is similar to the present position in South Africa.   
The objective of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is to foster a fair, 
competitive, transparent, efficient and integrated European financial market that offers high 
investor protection and allows for the creation of new markets and services.162  Both MiFID 
and regulation ATS intended to create a fair, level playing field for the different types of trading 
platforms.163  One author however notes, a distinction between the two regulatory efforts is that  
‘dark pools’ are not explicitly captured by MiFID even though they account for a substantial 
amount of trading volume, while in the United States, they are considered alternative trading 
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systems and are registered as broker-dealers that do not display public quotes as long as they 
are below the legally set threshold.164    
The European commission proposed amendments to MiFID resulting in MiFID II that will take 
effect 3 January 2018.  The new directive and will go a long way towards changing the 
landscape of off-exchange trading among other aspects of the financial markets in Europe.  
However, as it is not yet in force, only a brief examination will be done to compare the current 
the laws to the proposed ones. Furthermore, the effect of Britain’s exit from the European 
Union on financial regulation remains to be seen, therefore this paper examines the existing 
laws as they exist and are applied.    
(a) UNITED KINGDOM  
MiFID was a key development in the European regulatory atmosphere replacing the Investment 
Services Directive (93/22/EEC) and introducing concepts that had previously not existed within 
the regulatory framework like multilateral trading facilities and systematic internalizers.165  The 
United Kingdom transposed this directive by way of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000.166    The Financial Conduct Authority is tasked with the regulation of the trade of 
securities under this act. This is however subject to the European law which provides a unified 
framework for securities which encompasses investment firms, Multilateral Trading Facilit ies 
(MTFs)167, regulated markets (conventional exchanges) and financial instruments.180   
MiFID applies to investment firms and regulated markets.  It defines investment firms as any 
person whose regular occupation or business or the provision of investment services to third 
parties and/or the performance of one or more investment activities on a professional basis.  
Systematic internalizers are also included in the definition of investment firms as they are an 
organised, frequent and systematic basis to deal on own account by the execution of client 
orders outside a regulated market or Multilateral Trading Facility.168   Therefore, the directive 
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sought to capture the execution of trading in securities irrespective of the trading methods used 
to conclude these transactions.  It has a list of activities is classifies as investment services. 
These are; The reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financ ia l 
instruments, execution or orders on behalf of clients, dealing in own account, portfolio 
management, investment advice, underwriting financial instruments, placement of financ ia l 
orders and the operation of multilateral trading facilities.169    
A key development under MiFID was the removal of the concentration rule.170 Under this rule, 
firms could only route orders to regulated markets.  The removal of this restriction opened the 
market to other participants because orders for listed securities could then be routed to regulated 
markets, multilateral trading facilities or even systematic internalizers. 171  This allowed the 
alternative avenues to function and trade in the same securities as the regulated markets giving 
them legal recognition for regulatory purposes.  The main service in focus here is the operation 
of multilateral trading facilities as they can execute trades of public securities off the regulated 
exchange. A party with the intention of facilitating off exchange trading has the option of 
registering as a multilateral trading facility but they do not have to.172   
In Europe, Dark pools may be classified in one of two categories; Dark pools operated by 
broker-dealers or investment banks, also called crossing networks and dark pools operated as 
Multilateral Trading Facilities.  A crossing network is an alternative trading system that 
matches buy and sell orders electronically for execution without first routing the order to an 
exchange or other displayed market.173  They can be seen as merely the automation of overthe-
counter trades that have always been carried out to facilitate the execution of client’s orders.174  
A multilateral trading facility or MTF is a multilateral system operated by an investment firm 
or market operator which brings together multiple third party buying and selling interests in 
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financial instruments in accordance with non-discretionary rules.175  They however do not offer 
listing or clearing of securities and are in essence an alternative trading system to exchanges.   
Crossing networks do not have to comply with MiFID pre trade transparency requirements and 
with other rules imposed on regulated markets (conventional exchanges) and Multilatera l 
Trading Facilities such as the obligation to treat investors equally, to provide fair access to the 
trading platform and the market surveillance, and to operate a non-discretionary system for the 
execution of orders.176  These crossing networks exist under the scope of off-exchange trading 
and under the directive there is no requirement for pre trade transparency for such trades.177  
Those operated as MTFs however have to comply but they do benefit from some pre trade 
transparency waivers.191  The pre trade reporting obligations are however applied across the 
board for all public shares traded outside a regulated market.   
The directive further classifies the operation of an MTF as an investment service therefore 
placing an obligation on member states to ensure that their market participants comply with the 
provisions of the directive relevant to off-exchange trading.178   A party intending to operate a 
multilateral trading facility would have to register an investment firm.179  As an organisationa l 
requirement, these firms are required to establish, maintain and, operate effective 
organisational and administrative arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the rights of their clients. 180  
In instances where a conflict of interest still exists in spite of the measures the firm has in place, 
they have an obligation to disclose the exact nature of this likely conflict to their clients before 
undertaking any business on their behalf.181    
This directive also requires the firms to have an objective and non-discretionary criteria and 
rules for the efficient execution of orders,182 they are also obliged to have transparent rules for 
the criteria determining the financial instruments that can be traded on their platform under 
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their systems.183  Transparent rules and objective criteria are required governing access to the 
facility.  I submit that this was aimed towards promoting fairness in the markets.   
The directive further places an obligation on the firms operating MTFs to uphold the integr ity 
of the markets to prevent market abuse, insider trading and to timely report trades executed on 
their platform.198  It also places a requirement for pre-trade transparency requiring platforms to 
publish (on the platform on which these securities are registered) in real time the current orders 
and quotes relating to shares.184 There is however, an exception to this for systems that do not 
determine prices on their own but generate them from another system (this can be the central 
exchange) or for when the transactions are large in scale.185  It is this exception that allows for 
the creation of dark liquidity in the European Markets and hence dark pools.  
In October 2011, the European Commission released a proposal to amend and extend MiFID 
which is referred to as MiFID II. This will contain measures to regulate dark trading in Europe. 
This was approached from the perspective of the regulation of broker crossing networks which 
under MiFID are outside the regulatory scope and did not have to comply with the same rules 
as MTFs. The amended directive also modifies the waivers for pre-trade transparency.186   
The commission proposed a new category Organised Trading Facilities(OTFs) which was 
mainly to encompass the OTC derivative market and equities.  OTFs would encompass any 
type of electronic trading platform that matches orders multilaterally amongst the users of the 
platform but where there is some discretion over the way in which orders are executed.  This 
category was created to ensure that all systemized trading is captured under the new proposed 
MiFID framework to minimise regulatory arbitrage.  This category would include dark pools 
who under these changes would not be able to combine client orders with bilateral execution 
against the brokers own account.187  This would result in the categorization of Broker Crossing 
Networks as OTFs hence as a result the parties operating BCNs upon the coming into operation 
of MiFID II must either stop trading or register as MTFs.188   
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Prior to MiFID II, Broker Crossing Networks are not regulated and considered OTC markets. 
The amendments will force them to decide and as such modify their mechanisms to fit within 
the available definitions.  If they opt to become MTFs they would have to open their doors to 
all traders irrespective of volume and therefore run the risk of exposure to toxic liquidity. 189  
(Toxic liquidity is that provided by High Frequency Traders190) Compliance with MiFID would 
force them to admit traders on the basis on non-discretionary rules.191  Alternatively they could 
be systematic internalizers and will have to publish their quotes for more liquid securities. 192  
These above options can result in harm for institutional investors because they run the risk of 
trading among toxic liquidity193 in an MTF, or lose anonymity and confidentiality because of 
the requirement for quote display for Systematic internalizers.    
This directive focused on other aspects of investor protection and not just price. One of the 
measures introduced is the prohibition of platform operators to use their dark pool for their own 
proprietary trades.194  It emphasises best execution195 and client order handling196 therefore in 
the execution of an order, firms must obtain the best possible result for their clients considering 
price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other 
consideration relevant to the execution of the order.  Nevertheless, where there is a specific 
instruction from the client, the order shall be executed following this instruction.197   
(b) UNITED STATES  
Congress in the United States found that new data processing and communications techniques 
had created the opportunity for more efficient and effective market operations and it was in the 
public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and 
orderly markets to assure the economically effective execution of securities transactions.21 3   
                                                 
189 Order flow is toxic when it adversely selects market makers, who may be unaware they are providing liquidity 
at a loss. From: Easley D, López de Prado MM and O'Hara M 'Flow Toxicity and Liquidity in a High-frequency 
World' (2012) 25 The Review of Financial Studies .  
190 Easley D, López de Prado MM and O'Hara M 'Flow Toxicity and Liquidity in a High -frequency World' (2012) 
25 The Review of Financial Studies .  
191 Article 14   Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC.  
192 Matteo C Trading and dark pools of liquidity (Università degli Studi di Padova, 2014)42.  
193 Moloney N and Ferrarini G 'Reshaping order execution in the EU and the role of interest groups under 
MiFID II' (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review  560.  
194 Gabriel J 'Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new regulations' ^Fifty Shades of lights in Dark Pools new 
regulations 11-10-2016 15:13 UTC, available at http://uplaw.ch/fifty-shades-lights-dark-pools-new-regulations/, 
accessed on 11/10/2016 15:13  
195 Article 21 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC   
196 Article 22 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC   
197 Article 21 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC  213 
s11A(a)(1) Exchange Act 15 U.S.C 78k-1(a)(1).  
38  
  
Furthermore, there was a need to ensure fair competition between exchange markets and 
markets other than exchange markets.  On this basis, the Securities and Exchange Commiss ion 
adopted Regulation ATS (alternative trading systems)198 and later Regulation NMS (nationa l 
market system).199200    
To contextualise these regulations, it is necessary to look at the National Market System.  In 
1975, congress enacted Securities Acts Amendments.  These set forth five qualities that the 
markets should have.  They should be;  
(i) Economically efficient execution transactions.   
(ii) Fair competition.   
(iii)Availability to brokers, dealers and investors of information with respect to quotations 
and transactions.   
(iv) The practicability of brokers executing orders in the best market and,  
(v) An opportunity for investors orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer. 
216  
Congress found that these could be achieved by linking all markets for securities through 
information technology and hereby directed the SEC to facilitate the establishment of a nationa l 
market system(NMS).201   The NMS was established as a central market system for securities 
at which all buying and selling interests in these securities could participate and be represented 
under a competitive regime.202  It is under this system that the succeeding regulations operate.   
 (i)  REGULATION ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS (ATS)  
In 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation ATS 203  to 
establish a regulatory framework for Alternative Trading systems. This was in response to the 
rapid increase in number of platforms that offered off-exchange trading of securities. These 
platforms traded stocks on the national market system and provided services traditiona lly 
provided by national security exchanges.  These Alternative systems operate limit order books, 
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facilitate active price discovery, match counterparties and execute trades.  Regulation ATS 
adopted a regulatory framework for the regulation of securities markets designed to increase 
the regulation of alternative trading systems.220  This was done by changing the definition of 
exchange, enacting new rules and amending the existing ones relating to regulation of 
exchanges and broker-dealers  
The SEC defines an exchange as:   
‘…any organisation, association or group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorpora ted 
which constitutes, maintains and provides a market place or facilities for bringing together 
purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the 
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood and 
includes the market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.’204   
Key to the interpretation of this definition, is the SEC’s distinction between an exchange and 
brokers, dealers or other entities is in the characteristic of centralizing trading and providing 
buyers and sellers with buy and sell quotations on a continuous basis. This is so that they have 
a reasonable expectation that they can regularly execute their orders at those price quotations. 205    
Regulation ATS defines an Alternative Trading System as any organisation, person or system 
that maintains, constitutes or provides a market place bringing together purchasers and sellers 
of securities or for otherwise performing functions commonly carried out by a stock 
exchange.206  They however do not set rules governing conduct other than to do with trading 
on that facility and do not penalize subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.207   
The rules and amendments under Regulation ATS allow alternative trading systems to choose 
whether to register as national securities exchanges under section 6 or as broker-dealers under 
section 15 Exchanges Act208  and comply with additional requirements depending on their 
activities and trading volume.  The aim being to integrate the alternative systems into the 
                                                 
204 Section 3(a)(1) Securities and Exchange Act 1934.  
205 Domowitz I and Lee R 'The Legal Basis for Stock Exchanges: The Classification and Regulation of Automated 
Trading Systems' (May 1996) 46.  
206 242.300 (a)(1).  
207 Section 242.300 (a) (2) Title 17 Chapter II Part 242 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems 
Release Number 34-40760 17 CFR.   
208 Section 242.301 (a)(1) Chapter II Part 242 Title 17 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems 
Release Number 34-40760 17 CFR.  
40  
  
national market system, provide for their registration as exchanges and allow the registered 
exchanges to better compete.209  
In the adoption of Regulation ATS, Rule 3b-16 was enacted as part of Section 3(a) of the 
Exchange Act, it was designed to determine when a platform would have to register as an 
exchange based on the services provided.  Rule 3b-16 provided a functional test as to when a 
trading platform would be encompassed within the definition of an exchange.  Under this rule:  
‘…an organisation, association or group of persons shall be considered to constitute, maintain 
or provide a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities 
of for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions normally performed by a 
stock exchange if such organisation, association or group of persons; Brings together the orders 
for securities of multiple buyers and sellers and uses established, non-discretionary methods 
under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders 
agree to the terms of a trade.’210   
This rule specifically excluded systems that traditionally perform only traditional broker-dealer 
activities, including; systems that route orders to national securities exchanges, markets 
operated by a national securities association or a broker-dealer for execution or, systems that 
allow persons to enter orders for execution against the bids and offers of a single dealer.  
Therefore, a platform that did not meet the test as stipulated was not required to register as an 
exchange and an alternative trading system that is in compliance with Regulation ATS was not 
required to register as an exchange under Section 5 of the Exchange Act.211  This leads to the 
conclusion that off-market trades could be concluded by brokers and then routed to an exchange 
and broker-dealer dark pools could exist.     
To monitor these platforms that function as alternative trading systems, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires them to be registered as broker-dealers under Section 15 of the 
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Exchange Act and this obliges them to become members of an exchange.212  They will hence 
have to comply with the rules of the exchange which is a self-regulating organisation. In 
addition to the requirements at registration prior to commencing operations, alternative trading 
systems under the regulation must periodically report certain information about transactions 
and activities that they may have carried out.  They are required to report quarterly volume 
information about transactions for specified categories of securities and a list of all subscribers 
that traded through the platform in each quarter.213  Those subject to fair access obligations are 
further required to provide a list of all persons, granted, denied or limited access.231  
In addition to the above reporting requirements, the exemption from registration as an excha nge 
is conditioned on other requirements. Under Regulation ATS, a platform that displays 
subscriber orders and during the preceding six months had an average trading volume of 5 
percent or more of the aggregate average daily trading share volume for a given stock must 
provide to a national securities exchange the prices and sizes of the orders at the highest buy 
price and lowest sell price for such NMS stock for inclusion in the publicly available quotation 
data. 232  Although, they are not obliged to display trade volumes unless the volume traded 
exceeds 5% of the average daily trading volume of a stock.214  In the event that they do, they 
will have to make their quotations public.   Some authors suggest this is to temper the wouldbe 
effect of large anonymous trades on the overall quality of the market as the definitions of  
‘bid’ and ‘offer’ were also amended in the law to include actionable Indications of Interest for 
the purposes of disclosure obligations.234  
US stocks are traded simultaneously at a variety of different trading venues that participate in 
the national market system.215  This increase in available trading avenues creates a need for a 
regulatory authority that reintegrates multi avenue information to conduct effective market 
surveillance to detect the likelihood of abuse or manipulation.  The adoption of Regulation ATS 
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was the first step towards the legal recognition, regulation and monitoring of alternative trading 
platforms other than stock exchanges.   
 (ii)  REGULATION NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM (NMS)  
The Securities and Exchange Commission however went a step further with the adoption of 
Regulation National Market System (NMS).  This regulation adopted 3 rules: the order 
protection rule, the access rule and, sub penny pricing.   
The Order Protection Rule aimed to level the playing field for the investors by providing equal 
access to the prices and mandating that trades be executed at the best price.216  Therefore, orders 
for exchange listed stocks that are not hidden cannot be traded through (ignored). In its concept 
release, the SEC explained that this rule requires trading centres to establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the execution of trades 
at prices inferior to protected quotations displayed by other trading centres subject to an 
applicable exception.  To be protected, a quotation must be immediately and automatica l ly 
visible.237  This, favours publicly displayed orders and aids in the process of price discovery.   
The Access Rule was aimed at promoting access to quotations in stocks listed on the nationa l 
exchanges, this was aimed at preventing platforms from executing orders at a price that is 
inferior to one displayed on another market place. The result of this rule was that an 
environment was created where fair and efficient access to quotes through the National Market 
System.238  This was done by requiring the use of private linkages to facilitate access quotes 
and setting a cap on the fees charged by platforms for access to execute orders against their 
quotes. It also lowered the threshold required for price information from 20 percent to 5 percent 
of the average daily trading volume of a given NMS stock.217  In the event that a platform does 
not meet this threshold, it is exempted from the disclosure of price information and therefore 
can legally carry out dark trading (trading without displaying the available liquidity).218  It is 
this rule that provides the avenue under which dark pools function.   
The Sub-penny rule prohibits market participants from displaying or accepting quotations that 
are priced in an increment of less than a penny unless the stock price is under a dollar. This in 
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turn meant that quotations could not be accepted unless they provided a meaningful price 
improvement.219   
(c) ADDRESSSING THE POLICY CONCERNS  
(i)  PRICE DISCOVERY.  
The loss of price discovery was one of the policy concerns raised as a disadvantage of dark 
offexchange platforms because the prices reflected on the consolidated tape are not a result of 
the actions of all the players on the market.  Shorter and Miller submit that the loss of price 
discovery is countered in instances when the off-exchange platform does not make prices for 
the securities however derives it from the central exchange. 220   In several instances 
brokerdealer run platforms do not participate in price making but just derive it from the mid-
point of the best bid and offer as quoted on the central exchange. This is not the case with 
electronic price makers who have mechanisms in place for price determination.221    
Regulators therefore focus their efforts on limiting dark trading to transaction sizes that truly 
influence market price and on facilitating disclosure as much as possible. 222  This in turn 
facilitates price discovery in the lit venues.  I however submit that even when these platforms 
are using a reference price, they obstruct the operation of the market forces of demand and 
supply from operating as would be the case if the whole market was aware of the availability 
or demand for a stock at a given price. The thresholds act to limit the scope of this.  
 (ii)  MARKET FRAGMENTATION.  
To address the concerns of market fragmentation and price discovery, the adoption of the order 
protection rule223 and the access rule224 under Regulation National Market System225 would 
seem adequate. The order protection rule prevents the trading through of orders therefore a 
fragmented market is of no detrimental effect while the access rule gives all platforms access 
to all quotes available under the national market system.  Although this does not take into 
                                                 
219 Rule 612 Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-76474 17 CFR.  
220 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments  (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 10-11-2016 
13:20 UTC.  
221 Shorter G and Miller SR Dark Pools in Equity Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developments (2014) 
United States, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43739.pdf accessed on 10-11-2016 
13:20 UTC.  
222 Bierdermann Z 'Off-exchange Trading, Dark Pools and their Regulatory Dilemmas' (2015) 60 Public Finance 
Quaterly 78  
223 Rule 611 Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-76474 17 CFR  
224 Rule 610 Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems Release Number 34-76474 17 CFR  
225 Regulation NMS Stock Alternative Trading Sys tems Release Number 34-76474 17 CFR  
44  
  
consideration the below threshold and hidden trades, the requirement to report to the 
consolidated tape should cover this gap.   
 (iii)  FAIR COMPETITION AND ACCESS.   
The lack of uniform access to these off-exchange platforms was one of the policy concerns 
raised in the previous chapter, the SEC addressed this concern in both Regulation ATS and  
Regulation NMS by requiring Alternative Trading Systems to have non-discretionary rules 
when determining which parties to give access to its platform.226  Furthermore, those entities 
subject to fair access requirements have to quarterly provide a list of all persons granted, denied 
or limited access to their platform.227  The access concern was further addressed in Regulation 
NMS through the adoption of the access rule228 which gave all platforms access to all quotes 
on the national market system.  Irrespective of the platform an investor chose, they had access 
to quotes from other platforms operating in the national market system.  The order protection 
rule229  was also adopted and this ensures that orders that are not hidden cannot be traded 
through and therefore trades are executed at the best available price as displayed on any 
platform within the national market system.252  It removes the ability to have orders traded 
through which would be execution at a worse price.  Hence a broker cannot opt to route an 
order to a platform of their choosing when a better price is available on another platform.   
These efforts by the SEC were aimed at addressing the limited access to off-exchange platforms 
and as a result, an investor need not subscribe to these platforms to be able to access the stocks 
and quotes that are available on these platforms.  In Europe, the same effect of the order 
protection rule and the access rule was achieved in MiFID by the removal of the concentration 
rule which removed the requirement that orders are only routed to regulated markets.230  Now 
orders can be routed to alternative platforms allowing the brokers to achieve optimal execution 
of client’s orders.  After execution of the trade it will also have to be published in the platform 
on which it was listed.   
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 (iv)  INVESTOR PROTECTION.  
In 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) began requiring all offexchange 
platforms to report their aggregate weekly volume of transactions and number of trades by 
security. This was geared towards enhancing their surveillance efforts for these platforms and 
to monitor which of them may be subject to provisions of regulation ATS that come into effect 
when the percentage thresholds are exceeded.231   These reports together with the requirement 
to report information to the consolidated tape aims to address the concern of transparency as 
more information is available to market participants and regulators.  The reports to FINRA 
would distinguish between the different platforms and the trades carried out, making it possible 
to detect market manipulation.232  I however submit that the below threshold trades are still at 
risk of manipulation and harder to detect due to the small volume.   
Comparing the regulation United Kingdom and United States, it shows that the American 
perspective focuses mainly on price while the European perspective focuses on more aspects 
of which the price is only one.  Another main distinction in manner of regulation between the 
two is the fact that, the US regulation distinguishes traditional exchanges which are subject to 
stricter rules from alternative trading systems (brokers and others subject to less stringent 
requirements) while in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, Multilateral Trading 
Facilities are treated in a uniform manner and all rules apply to them however they may apply 
for exemption to pre trade transparency requirements if they meet the stipulated conditions.233   
Furthermore, Europe doesn’t have a single source of bid information but the US does via the 
consolidated tape which is aggregated information from all trading venues under the nationa l 
market system.   
I submit that in the above jurisdictions, the policy concerns raised by the authors have been 
addressed by the laws and regulations enacted to that effect.  The succeeding chapter will look 
at the South African law as it is and whether there is room for off-exchange trading of securities 
as well as whether the policy concerns as raised need to be addressed.   
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CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICAN REGULATION OF OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING.   
This chapter will examine the South African law regulating the trade of securities and the 
avenues of security trading that are legally recognised.  An analysis of the existing legal 
framework reveals that compared to other jurisdictions, South Africa has a very limited scope 
for conducting off-exchange trades of listed equity securities.    
(a) THE FINANCIAL MARKETS ACT.  
The Financial Markets Act234 is the primary piece of legislation regulating financial markets.  
It regulates exchanges, central security depositories; to regulate and control securities trading, 
clearing and settlement and the custody and administration of securities; to prohibit insider 
trading and other market abuses.235  The Act is administered by the Financial Services Board 
which is the primary regulator.  This Act in turn delegates some aspects of the regulation to the 
exchanges which are regulated persons as defined in the Act, however they have a degree of 
autonomy and delegated and are referred to as self-regulating organisations (SROs).  In its 
functioning, the FSB is supported by the Financial Markets Advisory Board and the FSB 
Directorate of Market Abuse.236  The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act237 also 
plays a role in regulating the financial markets but its focus is to regulate the rendering of 
financial advisory and intermediary services to clients.238  This governs who should be able to 
advise clients but not the platforms on which the trading is occurring.   
The Financial Markets Act239 defines an exchange as:  
“a person who constitutes, maintains and provides an infrastructure –  
(a) for bringing together buyers and sellers of securities;  
(b) matching bids and offers for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and   
(c) whereby a matched bid and offer for securities constitutes a transaction”.240   
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The Act makes it an offence to operate an exchange without being licensed to do so.241  If the 
activities of an entity fall within the Act’s definition of an exchange then it must be licenced as 
an exchange.  If the activities do not fall within this criterion then the entity need not register.  
This definition is the only one in South African law that would allow a party to legally 
constitute and maintain an infrastructure to bring together buyers and sellers of securities.  To 
perform the functions of an exchange an entity must be registered as such under the Act. 242  
This is after an application made and the requirements have been met.  The Act states that any 
juristic person may apply for a license as an exchange.  This entity must have; the requisite 
assets and resources in the republic to maintain the required infrastructure, have arrangements 
for the efficient and effective surveillance of all transactions effected through this exchange 
and supervise the users to identify possible market abuse and ensure compliance with the 
exchange rules and directives in the Act.243  This license, if granted, must specify the terms and 
conditions applicable to the exchange, categories of securities to be traded on that platform and 
where it operates.  At the initial application, the FSB would have to approve the operational 
rules and the listing requirements of the exchange and this license, if granted, would need to be 
renewed annually.244   
Trading shares listed on a licensed exchange is subject to the provisions of the Act245 and other 
relevant subordinate legislation including the rules of the exchange on which the shares are 
listed.  Therefore, Over-the-Counter trading structures that fall within the ambit of the Act by 
the nature of their activities need to be licensed or change their trading methodology that their 
activities do not fall within the Act’s definition of an exchange.  Notably, the focus of the 
amendments and the Financial Services Board has been on regulating the off-exchange trading 
of own shares by a listed company but not in instances when a third party unrelated to the 
company is facilitating the trade of listed securities off-exchange.246   
A person may only carry on the business of buying or selling securities if that person; is an 
authorised user and acts in compliance with the relevant exchange rules, effects such buying 
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and selling through an authorised user in compliance with the relevant exchange rules, is not 
an authorised user but is a financial institution transacting as a principal with another financ ia l 
institution also transacting as principal or when the entity is trading securities to give effect to 
the restructuring of a company or group of companies. This would be a corporate finance 
transaction.247   The Act also makes provision for the reporting of transactions concluded 
outside of an exchange by a financial institution when transacting with another financ ia l 
institution and both are acting as principals or when a party concludes a corporate finance 
transaction to give effect to the restructuring of a company.248   
The position of the Financial Services Board is that any off-exchange platform falling within 
the definition of an exchange based on its activities and not licensed as such is operating 
illegally.249  The off-exchange platforms could meet the definition in the act of an exchange, 
that is if they maintain, constitute and provide an infrastructure; for bringing together buyers  
and sellers of securities, matching bids and offers for securities of multiple buyers and sellers 
and where by a matched bid and offer for securities a constitutes a transaction.250  Notably 
though, this definition does not include the listing of these securities traded and these 
offexchange platforms do not provide the listing of securities. They trade in securities listed on 
the exchanges like the Johannesburg Stock Exchange resulting in a private law relationship 
based on a contract of sale.  The transaction would still need to be effected through the central 
exchange on which the securities are listed.   
(b) THE JOHANNESBURG STOCK EXCHANGE EQUITIES RULES.   
At present, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (hereafter referred to as the JSE) is the main 
operational stock exchange, although two other exchanges have been granted licences, the 
scope of this paper is only the JSE as it remains to be seen whether these new exchanges will 
be major players in the market.  Therefore, an examination of the trade of listed securities would 
begin by examining of the equities rules of the exchange on which they are listed.    
The purpose of the rules and directives is to achieve the objects of the JSE by providing 
procedures necessary to establish and regulate fair and efficient markets to ensure that the 
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business of the JSE is carried out in an orderly manner and with due adherence to the objects 
of the Financial Markets Act 2012, South Africa (hereafter referred to as the Act).251   
JSE listed securities mean those included in the list of securities kept by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.  The JSE uses the call auction system where an auction trade means a transaction 
matched automatically in the JSE equities trading system resulting from an uncrossing at the 
end of an auction call session252 whereby auction matching means the process of matching buy 
and sell orders according to a matching algorithm at the end of an auction session.276 The JSE 
is authorised by the Act to provide for categories of authorised users, requirements for 
admittance as an authorised user, exclusion of authorised users, requirements for an authorised 
user to perform regulated services.253  An applicant may seek to either provide trading services 
or custody services.    
The Act defines an authorised user as a person authorised by a licensed exchange to perform 
one or more securities services in terms of the exchange rules.254  The equities rules use the 
same definition of authorised user and defines a member as a category of authorised user 
admitted to the membership of the JSE under the equities rules.255  Relevant to the scope of this 
paper is members carrying out trading services.  A member carrying out trading services may 
receive client’s orders where an order means an instruction from a client or sell equity securities 
or an instruction to amend or cancel a prior instruction to buy or sell equity securities.256  These 
client orders are matched based on the following order of priority; price, whether the order is 
hidden257 or visible to the market, time of entry in the central order book.258    
The rules state that all transactions by members must be conducted through the central order 
book of the JSE equities trading system unless the transaction meets the criteria set out in the 
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rules for an off-book trade.259  This limits the ability of a broker to do off-market trading.  The 
terms of such an off-book trade may be negotiated between the parties to the transaction and 
the purchase and sale legs of the transaction must then be submitted to the trading system by 
the member or members who are party to the transaction.284  An off-book trade means a 
transaction in equity securities negotiated off the central order book and submitted by a member 
to the JSE equities trading system.285  Off-book principal trade is a transaction where a member 
trades as a principal in a single equity security where the transaction has a minimum value of 
R500 000 and comprises of at least six times the exchange market size.260  Such a transaction 
is only deemed valid once the purchase and sale legs of the transaction have been matched and 
confirmed by the trading system.261   
The issue at hand is the trade of listed securities on another platform other than on the exchange 
on which they are registered.  The equities rules of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange provide 
that all transactions by members must be conducted through the central order book except for 
transactions that meet the criteria for an off-book trade. This would seem to be the only current 
existing way of achieving the same practical result as an off-exchange trade by a member.   
According to the Equities rules of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, not all trades have to be 
executed through the central order book but may be executed as an off-book trade.  The rules 
contain a list of these transactions.262  These are; a book build trade,263 a block trade264 or a 
corporate finance transaction.265  On this basis, entities with the intention of executing trades 
away from the central order book have this option if the transaction can fit into one of the above 
                                                 
259 Section 6.10.4 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules. 
284 Section 6.10.2 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules  
285 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules definitions.  
260 Section 6.40.8 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.  
261 Section 6.10.3 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.   
262 Section 6.40 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.  
263 A bookbuild trade is a transaction where a member trades in a single equity security as an agent or a principal 
with another member in order for the second member or its clients to participate in a bookbuild. This is a price  
discovery mechanism by which during an initial offer, issuers do not  fix a price for the securities but provide a 
range and depending on the demand for the units, a price is fixed. From:  
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-08-09/news/27665381_1_book-building-issue-price-
floorprice.  accessed on 10-11-2016 13:20 UTC.  
264 A block trade is a transaction where a member trades as an agent or a principal in a single equity security and 
the transaction comprises at least the specified multiple of the exchange market size as set out in the directives. 
From: https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20Equities%20Rules.pdf . 
accessed on 09-11-2016 17:19 UTC.  
265 A corporate finance transaction in one that must be entered into in writing and requires public notification and 
complies with the requirements of transactions in the listing requirements. From: 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20Equities%20Rules.pdf .  
51  
  
criteria.  This is however not fully off-exchange trading and the clearing and settlement of these 
transactions would still be carried out in the same manner as all other trades on the regulated 
market.  When investors participate in an off-book trade on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
the trade must be reported immediately without delay. When they take place outside trading 
hours, they must be reported within 45 minutes of the commencement of the next off book 
trade reporting session.266  These transactions will then be ringfenced for settlement.  This 
would be the process in terms of which linked deliveries and receipts which emanate from off 
book trades are separated and distinguished from deliveries and receipts which emanate from 
transactions in the central order book of the JSE equities trading system.267  
All transactions must be settled electronically through Strate which is appointed by the JSE to 
manage the settlement of transactions in equity securities effected through the JSE equities 
trading system in accordance with the following principles; contract note, between the ultima te 
buyer and ultimate seller, on a rolling contractual basis or on a net basis. 268  
In the event of financial institutions transacting as principals, the trade would be submitted to 
the central securities depository for the transfer in beneficial ownership of the shares and would 
need to be reported to the registrar.  The South African central securities depository (Strate) 
recognised off market orders as trades in uncertified securities that are not concluded through 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange trading system and which are reported by the seller and 
purchaser of the uncertified securities to the relevant central securities depository participant 
for settlement through the central securities depository.269  These off-market orders could be; 
account transfers, portfolio moves, securities lending and borrowing, corporate action types 
and depository receipts.270  I submit that these category of trades is necessary for the purposes 
of legal and business practicality.   
On the basis of section 6.10.01 of the equity rules of the JSE, it would appear that other than 
the off-book trades provided for, the JSE does not recognise nor permit other forms of 
offexchange trading of securities listed on its platform by members as it clearly states that all 
transactions in equity securities by a member must be conducted through the central order book 
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of the JSE Equities trading system, unless the transaction meets the criteria for an off-book 
trade.297  Furthermore, even in instances where a trade meets the requirements for an off-book 
trade, and the terms have been negotiated, the sale and purchase legs of the transaction must be 
submitted to the trading system by members party to said transaction.  Such a transaction would 
only be deemed valid once the purchase and sale legs of the transaction have been matched and 
confirmed by the trading system.     
The equities rules are binding on members and their employees, they go further to state that the 
rules are binding on any person utilising the services of a member who concludes a transaction 
with a member in the course of the member’s business. 271   Hence, members must ensure 
settlement of all transactions in equities effected by them through the central order book of the 
JSE equities trading system.272  A member must also ensure settlement of all off-book trades 
in equity securities entered into as an agent on behalf of a client or as principal with a client. 273  
This is however subject to an exception where either one or two members are involved and 
where the clients who are parties to such an off-book trade have between themselves concluded 
the terms of the transaction and instructed a member or members to report the transaction 
through the equities trading system.274  This expressly contemplates the reporting of off-book 
trades between clients.    
The rules as they apply to members are clear.  The point of contention arises because of this 
exception.  The provision contemplating the reporting of trades carried out off-book between 
persons that are not members would seem to recognise that there is a scope for listed equity 
securities to be traded off-exchange, not fitting the off-book criteria and not involving a 
member other than to report the trade.  If this is the case, these transactions will only be subject 
to the provisions in Section 4 and 24 of the Act and ensure that the conduct does fall within the 
definition of an exchange.   
By the application of Section 4 of the Act, no person may carry on the business of buying and 
selling listed securities unless that person complies with Section 24.275  It also states that no 
person may in any manner directly or indirectly advertise or canvass for carrying on the 
                                                 
271 Section 2.30.02 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.   
272 Section 10.20.1 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.   
273 Section 10.20.02 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.   
274 Section 10.20.03 Johannesburg Stock Exchange Equities Rules.   
275 Section 4(1)(b) Act 19 of 2012.  
53  
  
business of an authorised user unless that person is an authorised user.276  Section 24 states that 
a person may only carry out the business of buying and selling listed securities if that person is 
an authorised user and acts in compliance with the relevant exchange rules.277  This provision 
prevents persons who are not members of the JSE from carrying out the business of buying and 
selling listed securities unless they effect such buying and selling through an authorised user in 
compliance with the relevant exchange rules.305  The exceptions to these rules apply to financ ia l 
institutions transacting as principal and corporate finance transactions subject to registrar 
approval.278  Financial institutions would have to report these trades in line with Section 25(2) 
of the Financial Markets Act.   
The provisions of the Act provide limited scope for members to trade in listed equity securitie s 
off-exchange provided they do not carry out the business of trading these securities.  In Dry 
Good Co v Lester, the courts defined carrying on business as;   
‘To prosecute or pursue a particular vocation or form of business as a continuous and 
permanent occupation and substantial employment. A single act of business transaction 
is not sufficient, but the systematic and habitual repetition of the same act may be.’279   
This definition together with the previously stated provisions of the Act and the equities rules 
result in the conclusion that in South Africa, a person may trade in listed equity securities off 
the exchange on which they are listed provided their acts do not amount to carrying out a 
business as above defined or amount to conduct that fits within the definition of an exchange.  
The earlier stated explanation of the definition of an exchange by the SEC in the American 
jurisprudence provides clarity by stating;   
‘…the distinction between an exchange and brokers, dealers or other entities is in the 
characteristic of centralizing trading and providing buyers and sellers with buy and sell 
quotations on a continuous basis so that they have a reasonable expectation that they can 
regularly execute their orders at those price quotations.’280  
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I submit that if an entity continuously creates a reasonable expectation that orders will be 
executed at a quoted price and maintains an infrastructure to meet this expectation, then their 
actions amount to performing the functions of an exchange.  This excludes the scope for an 
MTF to function in stocks on the JSE.  
In examining the American and European jurisprudence, the practice of internalisation came 
up several times.  In South Africa, the Act has no mention of internalisation and neither does 
the equities rules of the JSE.  Internalization also referred to as internalized trading is when an 
investor’s order is filled within the brokerage firm that the order was given to from stock that 
is held as inventory resulting in the order not being routed to any other platform to be filled. 281   
This would appear to be the same as a booked trade.  The rules of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange also do not provide for internalization of listed securities therefore any party with 
the intention executing trades in this manner would have to apply for an exchange license. This 
is because their conduct would fit into the South African definition of an exchange in the Act.282  
There may however be some scope for a booked trade done by way of internal trade between 
clients that doesn’t fall into the definition of an exchange.   
In 2016, the Financial Services Board granted operating licences to two new exchanges ZAR 
X and 4AX.  These are however not yet fully functional but should provide much needed 
competition to the only functional stock exchange the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.   ZAR X 
will be the first on the continent to introduce a T+0 settlement cycles which it aims to achieve 
by preclearing of shareholders prior to the transaction. However, the lack of standardisat ion 
between the existing exchanges would make dual listing difficult.   
Due to the advent of broad-based black economic empowerment deals there has been a growth 
of over-the-counter trading in South Africa.  Companies needed to facilitate the ownership of 
their shares by black individuals.  In 2014, the Financial Services Board started to clamp down 
on these platforms on the basis that they were illegally performing as exchanges without the 
requisite licensing.  It is unclear why these parties were not prosecuted.   These companies were 
given the option to register as exchanges to continue offering these services.  The registrar 
concluded that the nature of the functions of an exchange and whether an entity is required to 
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register as one is independent from the number of securities traded on that platform therefore, 
even when a company facilitates only the trade of its shares, it is still required to register as an 
exchange to be able to function legally. Therefore, a person who meets the three requirements 
set out in the definition283 accordingly operates an exchange regardless of whether such the 
infrastructure is for one security only. Worth noting however, the Act, does not prevent an 
exchange from including a wide scope for off-market trades in its rules.  But one would still 
have to avoid falling within the definition of an exchange.   
    
CHAPTER 6: THE WAY FORWARD FOR SOUTH AFRICA.   
The Financial Markets Act does not provide for the licensing of different tiers of market 
infrastructures and licensed exchanges with different requirements without fulfilling the 
functions and role of a self-regulatory organisation as outlined in the Act.  The Act however 
empowers the registrar to grant exemptions from the provisions of a section of the Act but only 
if the registrar is satisfied that the application of the section will cause the applicant or clients 
financial or other undue hardship and said exemption will not conflict with the achievement of 
the objects of the Act, which include investor protection and the promotion of fair, efficient, 
transparent and systemically sound financial markets.284 At this time, no entities have applied 
to the registrar for this exemption.   
South Africa has a partially self-regulation model for exchanges.  Hence, they are responsible 
for authorising and supervising authorised users in terms of its rules that they are bound by.  It 
is unlikely that other platforms providing similar services would be unlikely to comply with 
the stringent requirements that are expected under the self-regulating model.285  The licensing 
requirements to be an exchange are understandably rigorous and provide barriers to entry which 
in turn reduces the competition in South African financial markets.  
The restrictions in the equities rules don’t contemplate off-market trades of listed securities by 
members of the JSE other than the permitted off book trades.   Since they carry out the business 
of buying and selling securities, if they were to maintain an infrastructure for matching buyers 
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and sellers, they would fit in the definition of an exchange and must register as such.  
Nonmembers on the other hand may carry out these trades provided it does not amount to 
carrying out business.  I submit that creates uncertainty and leaves the issues open to 
consideration as to when a person would be deemed to be carrying out a business.  The courts 
in our jurisdiction have not been called upon either to clarify this issue.  The lack of uniformity 
in the application of the rule on off-exchange matching is undesirable.   
In the United States and Europe, the regulatory authorities developed mechanisms that allow 
for the different execution venues that perform more limited functions.   They seem to have 
taken the view that the benefits of recognising these platforms outweigh the concerns provided 
there is proper regulation.  An example of this is MiFID which caters for mechanisms where 
settlement is achieved bilaterally.  This approach promotes competition while ensuring investor 
protection is not compromised.  The Financial Markets Act does not have a definition of these 
execution venues nor does it have provisions that would regulate them in a manner similar to 
the existing exchanges.286   
Looking at the American approach, the regulators made it possible for the proliferation of 
offexchange platforms, this in in turn increased competition and led to the growth of the 
markets.  The establishment of a national market system was key to this as it serves to bridge 
the information gap between the different platforms and provide a central accessible source of 
trading information.  In Europe, the first step was to remove the concentration rule thereby 
allowing routing of orders to other platforms.  They however did not go as far as to establish a 
national market system which means that although investors can access orders on these 
platforms, there is no central platform to which the trading information from all platforms is 
consolidated other than reported on the exchange on which the shares are listed.   
The question however remains, whether South Africa should facilitate the creation of 
alternative trading avenues either in the form of crossing networks or MTFs allowing 
investment firms to bring together multiple interests in buying and selling interests in 
accordance with non-discretionary rules.  To this, I in part concur with the treasury which 
rejected this proposal citing that these avenues would fragment the South African market which 
is already small compared to its international counterparts and would hinder its growth and 
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liquidity.287    However, at present, an economic assessment would be required to further 
establish whether South Africa would benefit or suffer from fragmentation with greater 
competition and such as assessment should guide future legislative revisions.   
Furthermore, South Africa would either need to establish a national market system or legisla te 
with the aim of facilitating access to orders on all platforms by all investors.  Either option 
would seem redundant considering the size of the market.  Therefore, I submit that at present 
enforcing the law as it stands would be sufficient however, as local securities market grows, 
and with the advent of new exchanges, some might provide for a wide scope for off market 
trades.  It is recommended for the Financial Services Board to consider incorporating the new 
technological developments in their market structure reform to catch up with the global 
markets.    
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